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Persuasion of a privately informed receiver

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Author(s)

Anton Kolotilin, Tymofiy Mylovanov, Andriy Zapechelnyuk, Ming Li

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Abstract

We study persuasion mechanisms in linear environments. A receiver has a private type and chooses between two actions. A sender designs a persuasion mechanism or an experiment to disclose information about a payoff-relevant state. A persuasion mechanism conditions information disclosure on the receiver's report about his type, whereas an experiment discloses information independent of the receiver's type. We establish the equivalence of implementation by persuasion mechanisms and by experiments, and characterize optimal persuasion mechanisms.
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Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1949-1964
JournalEconometrica
Volume85
Issue number6
Early online date4 Dec 2017
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 4 Dec 2017

    Research areas

  • Bayesian persuasion, Information disclosure, Information design, Mechanism design without transfers, Experiments, Persuasion mechanism

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