My research interests are principally in the philosophy of mind and perception, and secondarily in certain areas of metaphysics. The topics that I am most interested in are listed below. I am best able to supervise doctoral research in areas 1-4 (though I can also supervise work on a few related topics):

1. Conscious experience - Intentionalism, phenomenal concepts, explanatory gap. I am currently writing a book on this, emphasising the role of the first-person perspective.
2. Temporal experience - I am interested in all aspects of current philosophical work on temporal experience, including, but not limited to, connections with the metaphysics of time.
3. Egocentric thought and experience - I have written about 'essential indexicals', the problem of cognitive dynamics, shared indexical/egocentric thoughts, and immunity to error through misidentification. The first-person perspective is important in much of my current work.
4. The nature of concepts/modes of presentation/mental files - I wrote my PhD thesis on this topic, and have recently returned to it in a couple of articles.
5. Emergent properties and 'new Zeno' phenomena - This started from a light-hearted article on 'new Zeno' phenomena, but led to more serious work on emergence and downward causation.

Published Work

You can listen to a public lecture that I gave at the Institute of Advanced Study in Durham ('Does Time Really Pass?') here, and a talk that I gave to the Aristotelian Society ('Why are Indexicals Essential?") here. You can also read my recent entry in the OUP blog.

See also my pages at Philpapers

Books

• Experiencing Time. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. [Book symposium in Inquiry]

• Simon Prosser and François Recanati (eds.) Immunity to Error Through Misidentification: New Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

 Articles, chapters etc.

• The Metaphysics of Mental Files. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 100 (2020): 657-676. [Draft]

• Locating the Contradiction in Our Understanding of Time. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 42 (2019). Commentary on Christoph Hoerl and Teresa McCormack, 'Thinking in and About Time: A Dual Systems Perspective on Temporal Cognition' Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 42 (2019). [Published Paper]

• Shared Modes of Presentation. Mind & Language, 34 (2019): 465-482. [Draft]

• Replies to Deng, Lee, and Skow. Inquiry, 61 (2018): 328-350. (Contribution to a book symposium on my book Experiencing Time.) [Draft]

• Rethinking the Specious Present. In Ian Phillips (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Temporal Experience. London: Routledge, 2017: 146-156. [Draft]

• Why are Indexicals Essential? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 115 (2015): 211-233. [Draft, Podcast]

• Is There a ‘Specious Present’? Insights (E-Journal of Durham Institute of Advanced Study, ISSN 1756-2074), 6 (2013). [Published Paper]

• Experience, Thought, and the Metaphysics of Time. In K. M. Jaszczolt and L. de Saussure (eds.), Time: Language, Cognition, and Reality. Oxford Studies of Time in Language and Thought, volume 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013: 157-174. [Draft]

• The Passage of Time. In Heather Dyke and Adrian Bardon (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Time. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013: 315-327. [Draft]

• Passage and Perception. Noûs, 47 (2013): 69-84. [Draft]

• Emergent Causation. Philosophical Studies, 159 (2012): 21-39. [Draft]

• Why Does Time Seem to Pass? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 85 (2012): 92-116. [Draft]

• Sources of Immunity to Error Through Misidentification. In S. Prosser and F. Recanati (eds.) Immunity to Error Through Misidentification: New Essays. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012: 158-179. [Draft]

• Affordances and Phenomenal Character in Spatial Perception. The Philosophical Review, 120.4 (2011): 475-513. [Draft]

• Zeno Objects and Supervenience. Analysis, 69 (2009): 18-26. [Draft]

• The Two-Dimensional Content of Consciousness. Philosophical Studies, 136 (2007): 319-349. [Draft]

• Could We Experience the Passage of Time? Ratio, 20.1 (2007): 75-90. Reprinted in L. Nathan Oaklander (ed.), Philosophy of Time: Critical Concepts in Philosophy. New York/London: Routledge, 2008. [Draft]

• The Eleatic Non-Stick Frying Pan. Analysis, 66 (2006): 187-194. [Draft]

• Temporal Metaphysics in Z-Land. Synthese, 149 (2006): 77-96. [Draft]

• Cognitive Dynamics and Indexicals. Mind & Language, 20 (2005): 369-391. [Draft]

• A New Problem for the A-Theory of Time. The Philosophical Quarterly, 50 (2000): 494-498. [Draft]