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Asymmetric diffusion: World Bank 'best practice' and the spread of arbitration in national investment laws

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Asymmetric diffusion : World Bank 'best practice' and the spread of arbitration in national investment laws. / Berge, Tarald Laudal; St John, Taylor.

In: Review of International Political Economy, Vol. Latest Articles, 25.02.2020, p. 1-27.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Harvard

Berge, TL & St John, T 2020, 'Asymmetric diffusion: World Bank 'best practice' and the spread of arbitration in national investment laws', Review of International Political Economy, vol. Latest Articles, pp. 1-27. https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2020.1719429

APA

Berge, T. L., & St John, T. (2020). Asymmetric diffusion: World Bank 'best practice' and the spread of arbitration in national investment laws. Review of International Political Economy, Latest Articles, 1-27. https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2020.1719429

Vancouver

Berge TL, St John T. Asymmetric diffusion: World Bank 'best practice' and the spread of arbitration in national investment laws. Review of International Political Economy. 2020 Feb 25;Latest Articles:1-27. https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2020.1719429

Author

Berge, Tarald Laudal ; St John, Taylor. / Asymmetric diffusion : World Bank 'best practice' and the spread of arbitration in national investment laws. In: Review of International Political Economy. 2020 ; Vol. Latest Articles. pp. 1-27.

Bibtex - Download

@article{e4984ad6faeb46ebabdaee1c21474aaf,
title = "Asymmetric diffusion: World Bank 'best practice' and the spread of arbitration in national investment laws",
abstract = "Globally, 74 countries have domestic investment laws that mention investor-state arbitration and 42 of these laws provide consent to it. That is, they give foreign investors the right to bypass national courts and bring claims directly to arbitration. What explains this variation, and why do any governments include investor-state arbitration in domestic legislation? We argue that governments incorporate arbitration into their domestic laws because doing so was labelled {\textquoteleft}international best practice{\textquoteright} by specialist units at the World Bank. We introduce the concept of asymmetric diffusion, which occurs when a policy is framed as international best practice but only recommended to a subset of states. No developed state consents to arbitration in their domestic law, nor does the World Bank recommend that they do so. Yet we show that governments who receive technical assistance from the World Bank{\textquoteright}s Foreign Investment Advisory Service are more likely to include arbitration in their laws. We first use event history analysis and find that receiving World Bank technical assistance is an exceptionally strong predictor of domestic investment laws with arbitration. Then we illustrate our argument with a case study of the Kyrgyz Republic{\textquoteright}s 2003 law. ",
keywords = "Foreign direct investment, National investment laws, Investor-state dispute settlement, World Bank, Arbitration, Technical assistance, Templates",
author = "Berge, {Tarald Laudal} and {St John}, Taylor",
year = "2020",
month = feb,
day = "25",
doi = "10.1080/09692290.2020.1719429",
language = "English",
volume = "Latest Articles",
pages = "1--27",
journal = "Review of International Political Economy",
issn = "0969-2290",
publisher = "Routledge",

}

RIS (suitable for import to EndNote) - Download

TY - JOUR

T1 - Asymmetric diffusion

T2 - World Bank 'best practice' and the spread of arbitration in national investment laws

AU - Berge, Tarald Laudal

AU - St John, Taylor

PY - 2020/2/25

Y1 - 2020/2/25

N2 - Globally, 74 countries have domestic investment laws that mention investor-state arbitration and 42 of these laws provide consent to it. That is, they give foreign investors the right to bypass national courts and bring claims directly to arbitration. What explains this variation, and why do any governments include investor-state arbitration in domestic legislation? We argue that governments incorporate arbitration into their domestic laws because doing so was labelled ‘international best practice’ by specialist units at the World Bank. We introduce the concept of asymmetric diffusion, which occurs when a policy is framed as international best practice but only recommended to a subset of states. No developed state consents to arbitration in their domestic law, nor does the World Bank recommend that they do so. Yet we show that governments who receive technical assistance from the World Bank’s Foreign Investment Advisory Service are more likely to include arbitration in their laws. We first use event history analysis and find that receiving World Bank technical assistance is an exceptionally strong predictor of domestic investment laws with arbitration. Then we illustrate our argument with a case study of the Kyrgyz Republic’s 2003 law.

AB - Globally, 74 countries have domestic investment laws that mention investor-state arbitration and 42 of these laws provide consent to it. That is, they give foreign investors the right to bypass national courts and bring claims directly to arbitration. What explains this variation, and why do any governments include investor-state arbitration in domestic legislation? We argue that governments incorporate arbitration into their domestic laws because doing so was labelled ‘international best practice’ by specialist units at the World Bank. We introduce the concept of asymmetric diffusion, which occurs when a policy is framed as international best practice but only recommended to a subset of states. No developed state consents to arbitration in their domestic law, nor does the World Bank recommend that they do so. Yet we show that governments who receive technical assistance from the World Bank’s Foreign Investment Advisory Service are more likely to include arbitration in their laws. We first use event history analysis and find that receiving World Bank technical assistance is an exceptionally strong predictor of domestic investment laws with arbitration. Then we illustrate our argument with a case study of the Kyrgyz Republic’s 2003 law.

KW - Foreign direct investment

KW - National investment laws

KW - Investor-state dispute settlement

KW - World Bank

KW - Arbitration

KW - Technical assistance

KW - Templates

U2 - 10.1080/09692290.2020.1719429

DO - 10.1080/09692290.2020.1719429

M3 - Article

VL - Latest Articles

SP - 1

EP - 27

JO - Review of International Political Economy

JF - Review of International Political Economy

SN - 0969-2290

ER -

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