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Optimal allocation with ex post verification and limited penalties

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Optimal allocation with ex post verification and limited penalties. / Mylovanov , Tymofiy; Zapechelnyuk, Andriy.

In: American Economic Review, Vol. 107, No. 9, 09.2017, p. 2666-2694.

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Mylovanov , T & Zapechelnyuk, A 2017, 'Optimal allocation with ex post verification and limited penalties' American Economic Review, vol. 107, no. 9, pp. 2666-2694. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20140494

APA

Mylovanov , T., & Zapechelnyuk, A. (2017). Optimal allocation with ex post verification and limited penalties. American Economic Review, 107(9), 2666-2694. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20140494

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Mylovanov T, Zapechelnyuk A. Optimal allocation with ex post verification and limited penalties. American Economic Review. 2017 Sep;107(9):2666-2694. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20140494

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Mylovanov , Tymofiy ; Zapechelnyuk, Andriy. / Optimal allocation with ex post verification and limited penalties. In: American Economic Review. 2017 ; Vol. 107, No. 9. pp. 2666-2694.

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@article{2646e2f03a3b48bc907887159537798f,
title = "Optimal allocation with ex post verification and limited penalties",
abstract = "Several agents with privately known social values compete for a prize. The prize is allocated based on the claims of the agents, and the winner is subject to a limited penalty if he makes a false claim. If the number of agents is large, the optimal mechanism places all agents above a threshold onto a shortlist along with a fraction of agents below the threshold, and then allocates the prize to a random agent on the shortlist. When the number of agents is small, the optimal mechanism allocates the prize to the agent who makes the highest claim, but restricts the range of claims above and below.",
keywords = "Mechanism design",
author = "Tymofiy Mylovanov and Andriy Zapechelnyuk",
year = "2017",
month = "9",
doi = "10.1257/aer.20140494",
language = "English",
volume = "107",
pages = "2666--2694",
journal = "American Economic Review",
issn = "0002-8282",
publisher = "American Economic Association",
number = "9",

}

RIS (suitable for import to EndNote) - Download

TY - JOUR

T1 - Optimal allocation with ex post verification and limited penalties

AU - Mylovanov , Tymofiy

AU - Zapechelnyuk, Andriy

PY - 2017/9

Y1 - 2017/9

N2 - Several agents with privately known social values compete for a prize. The prize is allocated based on the claims of the agents, and the winner is subject to a limited penalty if he makes a false claim. If the number of agents is large, the optimal mechanism places all agents above a threshold onto a shortlist along with a fraction of agents below the threshold, and then allocates the prize to a random agent on the shortlist. When the number of agents is small, the optimal mechanism allocates the prize to the agent who makes the highest claim, but restricts the range of claims above and below.

AB - Several agents with privately known social values compete for a prize. The prize is allocated based on the claims of the agents, and the winner is subject to a limited penalty if he makes a false claim. If the number of agents is large, the optimal mechanism places all agents above a threshold onto a shortlist along with a fraction of agents below the threshold, and then allocates the prize to a random agent on the shortlist. When the number of agents is small, the optimal mechanism allocates the prize to the agent who makes the highest claim, but restricts the range of claims above and below.

KW - Mechanism design

U2 - 10.1257/aer.20140494

DO - 10.1257/aer.20140494

M3 - Article

VL - 107

SP - 2666

EP - 2694

JO - American Economic Review

T2 - American Economic Review

JF - American Economic Review

SN - 0002-8282

IS - 9

ER -

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ID: 249748037