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Optimal persuasion with an application to media censorship

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paper

Author(s)

Anton Kolotilin, Tymofiy Mylovanov, Andriy Zapechelnyuk

School/Research organisations

Abstract

A sender designs a signal about the state of the world to persuade a receiver. Under standard assumptions, an optimal signal reveals the states below a cutoff and pools the states above the cutoff. This result holds in continuous and discrete environments. The optimal signal is less informative if the sender is more biased and if the receiver is easier to persuade. We apply our results to the problem of media censorship by a government.
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Details

Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationSt Andrews
PublisherUniversity of St Andrews
Pages1-23
Number of pages23
Publication statusPublished - 3 Oct 2019

Publication series

NameSchool of Economics and Finance Discussion Paper
PublisherUniversity of St Andrews
No.1903
ISSN (Print)0962-4031
ISSN (Electronic)2055-303X

    Research areas

  • Bayesian persuasion, Information design, Upper censorship, Lower censorship, Media censorship

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