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Optimal quality certification

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Open Access Status

  • Embargoed (until 31/12/20)

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Abstract

Quality certification not only informs consumers, but also stimulates producers to supply better quality products. We study a problem of quality certification in a moral hazard setting. We show that, under standard assumptions, simple certification systems, such as quality assurance rule and pass-fail rule, are optimal.
Our solution method involves interpreting the certification problem as a delegation problem.
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Details

Original languageEnglish
JournalAmerican Economic Review: Insights
VolumeForthcoming
Publication statusAccepted/In press - 11 Oct 2019

    Research areas

  • Certification, Bayesian persuasion, Information disclosure, Information design, Delegation, Moral hazard, Career concerns

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