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Persuasion of a privately informed receiver

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Persuasion of a privately informed receiver. / Kolotilin, Anton; Mylovanov, Tymofiy; Zapechelnyuk, Andriy; Li, Ming.

In: Econometrica, Vol. 85, No. 6, 04.12.2017, p. 1949-1964.

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Kolotilin, A, Mylovanov, T, Zapechelnyuk, A & Li, M 2017, 'Persuasion of a privately informed receiver' Econometrica, vol 85, no. 6, pp. 1949-1964. DOI: 10.3982/ECTA13251

APA

Kolotilin, A., Mylovanov, T., Zapechelnyuk, A., & Li, M. (2017). Persuasion of a privately informed receiver. Econometrica, 85(6), 1949-1964. DOI: 10.3982/ECTA13251

Vancouver

Kolotilin A, Mylovanov T, Zapechelnyuk A, Li M. Persuasion of a privately informed receiver. Econometrica. 2017 Dec 4;85(6):1949-1964. Available from, DOI: 10.3982/ECTA13251

Author

Kolotilin, Anton; Mylovanov, Tymofiy; Zapechelnyuk, Andriy; Li, Ming / Persuasion of a privately informed receiver.

In: Econometrica, Vol. 85, No. 6, 04.12.2017, p. 1949-1964.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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@article{608fc2e1e3984792a70b0da47e7dfa35,
title = "Persuasion of a privately informed receiver",
abstract = "We study persuasion mechanisms in linear environments. A receiver has a private type and chooses between two actions. A sender designs a persuasion mechanism or an experiment to disclose information about a payoff-relevant state. A persuasion mechanism conditions information disclosure on the receiver's report about his type, whereas an experiment discloses information independent of the receiver's type. We establish the equivalence of implementation by persuasion mechanisms and by experiments, and characterize optimal persuasion mechanisms.",
keywords = "Bayesian persuasion, Information disclosure, Information design, Mechanism design without transfers, Experiments, Persuasion mechanism",
author = "Anton Kolotilin and Tymofiy Mylovanov and Andriy Zapechelnyuk and Ming Li",
note = "Kolotilin acknowledges financial support from the Australian Research Council. Zapechelnyuk acknowledges financial support from the Economic and Social Research Council (grant no. ES/N01829X/1)",
year = "2017",
month = "12",
doi = "10.3982/ECTA13251",
volume = "85",
pages = "1949--1964",
journal = "Econometrica",
issn = "0012-9682",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",
number = "6",

}

RIS (suitable for import to EndNote) - Download

TY - JOUR

T1 - Persuasion of a privately informed receiver

AU - Kolotilin,Anton

AU - Mylovanov,Tymofiy

AU - Zapechelnyuk,Andriy

AU - Li,Ming

N1 - Kolotilin acknowledges financial support from the Australian Research Council. Zapechelnyuk acknowledges financial support from the Economic and Social Research Council (grant no. ES/N01829X/1)

PY - 2017/12/4

Y1 - 2017/12/4

N2 - We study persuasion mechanisms in linear environments. A receiver has a private type and chooses between two actions. A sender designs a persuasion mechanism or an experiment to disclose information about a payoff-relevant state. A persuasion mechanism conditions information disclosure on the receiver's report about his type, whereas an experiment discloses information independent of the receiver's type. We establish the equivalence of implementation by persuasion mechanisms and by experiments, and characterize optimal persuasion mechanisms.

AB - We study persuasion mechanisms in linear environments. A receiver has a private type and chooses between two actions. A sender designs a persuasion mechanism or an experiment to disclose information about a payoff-relevant state. A persuasion mechanism conditions information disclosure on the receiver's report about his type, whereas an experiment discloses information independent of the receiver's type. We establish the equivalence of implementation by persuasion mechanisms and by experiments, and characterize optimal persuasion mechanisms.

KW - Bayesian persuasion

KW - Information disclosure

KW - Information design

KW - Mechanism design without transfers

KW - Experiments

KW - Persuasion mechanism

UR - http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.3982/ECTA13251/full

U2 - 10.3982/ECTA13251

DO - 10.3982/ECTA13251

M3 - Article

VL - 85

SP - 1949

EP - 1964

JO - Econometrica

T2 - Econometrica

JF - Econometrica

SN - 0012-9682

IS - 6

ER -

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