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The fundamental problem of logical omniscience

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Author(s)

Peter Hawke, Aybüke Özgün, Franz Berto

School/Research organisations

Abstract

We propose a solution to the problem of logical omniscience in what we take to be its fundamental version: as concerning arbitrary agents and the knowledge attitude per se. Our logic of knowledge is a spin-off from a general theory of thick content, whereby the content of a sentence has two components: (i) an intension, taking care of truth conditions; and (ii) a topic, taking care of subject matter. We present a list of plausible logical validities and invalidities for the logic of knowledge per se for arbitrary agents, and isolate three explanatory factors for them: (1) the topic-sensitivity of content; (2) the fragmentation of knowledge states; (3) the defeasibility of knowledge acquisition. We then present a novel dynamic epistemic logic that yields precisely the desired validities and invalidities, for which we provide expressivity and completeness results. We contrast this with related systems and address possible objections.
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Details

Original languageEnglish
Number of pages40
JournalJournal of Philosophical Logic
VolumeOnline First
Early online date20 Dec 2019
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 20 Dec 2019

    Research areas

  • Aboutness, Subject matter, Logical omniscience, Dynamic epistemic logic, Thick content

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