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Understanding and sharing intentions: the origins of cultural cognition

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Understanding and sharing intentions : the origins of cultural cognition. / Tomasello, Michael; Carpenter, Malinda; Call, Josep; Behne, Tanya; Moll, Henrike.

In: Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Vol. 28, No. 5, 10.2005, p. 675-691.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Harvard

Tomasello, M, Carpenter, M, Call, J, Behne, T & Moll, H 2005, 'Understanding and sharing intentions: the origins of cultural cognition', Behavioral and Brain Sciences, vol. 28, no. 5, pp. 675-691. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X05000129

APA

Tomasello, M., Carpenter, M., Call, J., Behne, T., & Moll, H. (2005). Understanding and sharing intentions: the origins of cultural cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 28(5), 675-691. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X05000129

Vancouver

Tomasello M, Carpenter M, Call J, Behne T, Moll H. Understanding and sharing intentions: the origins of cultural cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 2005 Oct;28(5):675-691. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X05000129

Author

Tomasello, Michael ; Carpenter, Malinda ; Call, Josep ; Behne, Tanya ; Moll, Henrike. / Understanding and sharing intentions : the origins of cultural cognition. In: Behavioral and Brain Sciences. 2005 ; Vol. 28, No. 5. pp. 675-691.

Bibtex - Download

@article{75981f20f33f40deb4b8e08c2ed920b4,
title = "Understanding and sharing intentions: the origins of cultural cognition",
abstract = "We propose that the crucial difference between human cognition and that of other species is the ability to participate with others in collaborative activities with shared goals and intentions: shared intentionality. Participation in such activities requires not only especially powerful forms of intention reading and cultural learning, but also a unique motivation to share psychological states with others and unique forms of cognitive representation for doing so. The result of participating in these activities is species-unique forms of cultural cognition and evolution, enabling everything from the creation and use of linguistic symbols to the construction of social norms and individual beliefs to the establishment of social institutions. In support of this proposal we argue and present evidence that great apes (and some children with autism) understand the basics of intentional action, but they still do not participate in activities involving joint intentions and attention (shared intentionality). Human children's skills of shared intentionality develop gradually during the first 14 months of life as two ontogenetic pathways intertwine: (1) the general ape line of understanding others as animate, goal-directed, and intentional agents; and (2) a species-unique motivation to share emotions, experience, and activities with other persons. The developmental outcome is children's ability to construct dialogic cognitive representations, which enable them to participate in earnest in the collectivity that is human cognition.",
keywords = "Aging, Animals, Autistic Disorder, Biological Evolution, Cognition, Cooperative Behavior, Culture, Goals, Humans, Primates, Social Behavior, Volition",
author = "Michael Tomasello and Malinda Carpenter and Josep Call and Tanya Behne and Henrike Moll",
year = "2005",
month = oct,
doi = "10.1017/S0140525X05000129",
language = "English",
volume = "28",
pages = "675--691",
journal = "Behavioral and Brain Sciences",
issn = "0140-525X",
publisher = "CAMBRIDGE UNIV PRESS",
number = "5",

}

RIS (suitable for import to EndNote) - Download

TY - JOUR

T1 - Understanding and sharing intentions

T2 - the origins of cultural cognition

AU - Tomasello, Michael

AU - Carpenter, Malinda

AU - Call, Josep

AU - Behne, Tanya

AU - Moll, Henrike

PY - 2005/10

Y1 - 2005/10

N2 - We propose that the crucial difference between human cognition and that of other species is the ability to participate with others in collaborative activities with shared goals and intentions: shared intentionality. Participation in such activities requires not only especially powerful forms of intention reading and cultural learning, but also a unique motivation to share psychological states with others and unique forms of cognitive representation for doing so. The result of participating in these activities is species-unique forms of cultural cognition and evolution, enabling everything from the creation and use of linguistic symbols to the construction of social norms and individual beliefs to the establishment of social institutions. In support of this proposal we argue and present evidence that great apes (and some children with autism) understand the basics of intentional action, but they still do not participate in activities involving joint intentions and attention (shared intentionality). Human children's skills of shared intentionality develop gradually during the first 14 months of life as two ontogenetic pathways intertwine: (1) the general ape line of understanding others as animate, goal-directed, and intentional agents; and (2) a species-unique motivation to share emotions, experience, and activities with other persons. The developmental outcome is children's ability to construct dialogic cognitive representations, which enable them to participate in earnest in the collectivity that is human cognition.

AB - We propose that the crucial difference between human cognition and that of other species is the ability to participate with others in collaborative activities with shared goals and intentions: shared intentionality. Participation in such activities requires not only especially powerful forms of intention reading and cultural learning, but also a unique motivation to share psychological states with others and unique forms of cognitive representation for doing so. The result of participating in these activities is species-unique forms of cultural cognition and evolution, enabling everything from the creation and use of linguistic symbols to the construction of social norms and individual beliefs to the establishment of social institutions. In support of this proposal we argue and present evidence that great apes (and some children with autism) understand the basics of intentional action, but they still do not participate in activities involving joint intentions and attention (shared intentionality). Human children's skills of shared intentionality develop gradually during the first 14 months of life as two ontogenetic pathways intertwine: (1) the general ape line of understanding others as animate, goal-directed, and intentional agents; and (2) a species-unique motivation to share emotions, experience, and activities with other persons. The developmental outcome is children's ability to construct dialogic cognitive representations, which enable them to participate in earnest in the collectivity that is human cognition.

KW - Aging

KW - Animals

KW - Autistic Disorder

KW - Biological Evolution

KW - Cognition

KW - Cooperative Behavior

KW - Culture

KW - Goals

KW - Humans

KW - Primates

KW - Social Behavior

KW - Volition

U2 - 10.1017/S0140525X05000129

DO - 10.1017/S0140525X05000129

M3 - Article

C2 - 16262930

VL - 28

SP - 675

EP - 691

JO - Behavioral and Brain Sciences

JF - Behavioral and Brain Sciences

SN - 0140-525X

IS - 5

ER -

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